Dr. Jeffrey SachsÕ ÒThe End of PovertyÓ:
A Political Review
by
George Caffentzis
At
length the term-day, the fatal Martinmas, arrived, and violent measures of
ejection were resorted to. A strong posse of peace-officers, sufficient to
render all resistance vain, charged the inhabitants to depart by noon; and as
they did not obey, the officers, in terms of their warrant, proceeded to unroof
the cottages, and pull down the wretched doors and windows,--a summary and
effectual mode of ejection, still practiced in some remote parts of Scotland,
when a tenant proves refractory.
-Sir Walter Scott, Guy Mannering or The Astrologer (1829)
Neoliberal
globalization entered into its first major crisis seven summers ago, with the
so-called ÒAsian Financial Crisis.Ó Since then the ideological power of this
form of capitalism has been slowly ebbing. The once attractive image of the
creative powers of humanity finally being brought together in the process of
globalization for the Ògeneral welfareÓ by borderless transfers of money,
capital and labor at the speed of light now seems to be a nostalgic relic.
Since 1997, along with the continuing economic crises and stagnation of Europe,
South America, and Africa, neoliberal globalization has faced two major
ideological reversals. The first reversal is associated with a city (Seattle)
and the second with a date (September 11, 2001).
The street blockades
that temporarily halted the World Trade Organization meetings in Seattle at the
end of November 1999, brought to planetary consciousness the existence of a
global movement of resistance to neoliberal globalization. This movement had
been growing in the literally thousands of ÒIMF riots,Ó general strikes and
guerrilla wars in the Third World since the mid-1980s against structural
adjustment programs (the ÒwedgesÓ
that opened economies previously resistant to complete control by international
capital). But the sudden appearance on streets of the MicrosoftÕs headquarters
city of a movement capable of stopping the apparent unstoppable locomotive of
globalization made it clear that there was another reality that was not buying
a future whose only aim was to put the world up for sale to the highest bidder.
On the contrary, the movement was able to project an image of globalization as
resulting in unprecedented immiseration for people throughout the planet unless
it was stopped.
The September 11,
2001 destruction of the World Trade Center Towers and the killing of three
thousand people were followed by a Òwar on terrorismÓ that revealed the
military aspect of globalization: globalizationÕs invisible hand required an
equally global iron fist. Instead of
dealing with 9/11 as a crime whose perpetrators were to be apprehended, tried
and convicted on the basis of international law, it was seen by the Bush
Administration as a symbolic attack on the USÕs status as the hegemonic power guaranteeing the operation of the
rules of the world market. George
W. Bush soon after 9/11 expressed this vision when he identified the real enemy as Òthe axis of evilÓ--Iraq, Iran and North
Korea—and any of the other unnamed 30 or 40 other Òrogue,Ó or potentially
Òterrorist-harboringÓ states throughout the planet. Indeed, Osama bin Ladin and
his project for founding a new Caliphate was all but forgotten in the rush to
discipline nation states that for one reason or another were not completely open
to global capital flows (Iraq in particular). But this image of globalization
as requiring a literally ÒinfiniteÓ war against recalcitrant states and
populations (branded by BushÕs neoconservative advisors as Òanti-democraticÓ)
was hardly inspiring, especially since it undermined globalizationÕs promise of
a closer, more interdependent world where it was in everyoneÕs interest to
Òjust get along.Ó
GlobalizationÕs
ideological crisis had deepened to the point that by the end of 2004 all the
major efforts to extend the ÒglobalizationÓ agenda (CAFTA, FTAA, the Doha
Round, etc.) were being stalled on both the street and the diplomatic levels.
Jeffrey Sachs wrote and published his book, The End of Poverty: How We Can
Make It Happen in Our Lifetime (as
well as a series of related op-ed articles in the New York Times), in early 2005 to respond to this ideological and
political crisis. For Sachs represents those who are convinced that neoliberal
globalization, if properly managed, is the only path to a future without abject
poverty and misery for billions of people (and indeed is the only alternative
for the survival of capitalism itself). The bookÕs publication was timed to
reach its greatest audience in early July when the G8 ÒleadersÓ met in Scotland
to consider a new Òanti-poverty packageÓ for African nations that was developed
by a variety of agencies from the British Foreign Office, to the UN, to
academic centers like Earth Institute that Sachs heads in NYC, to the
organizers of the ÒLive8Ó concerts like Bob Geldorf and Bono.
There is much that
is unattractive about the book, besides its ideological purpose. The End of
Poverty is one part
self-congratulatory memoir of SachsÕ roles as advisor to the governments of
Bolivia, Russia, Poland, India, China and part world-historical tract
justifying the ultimate rationality of neoliberal capitalism (if it is properly
applied to ÒsickÓ countries by Òclinical economistsÓ like himself). In the
first part of the book Sachs tells us what he advised these governments to do during
the time of his involvement, but invariably he adds an upbeat note, even when
the results were patently catastrophic (e.g., it is estimated that millions of
Russians, especially men, died prematurely because of the collapse of wages and
the public health system during the time that Sachs was advising the Yelstin
government—perhaps equal to the death rate of a ÒmoderateÓ nuclear war!)
But SachsÕ panglossian comment on this episode is: ÒLooking back, would I have
advised Russia differently know what I know today?...To a large extent, the
answer is noÉ.Most of the bad things that happened—such as the massive
theft of state assets under the rubric of privatization—were directly
contrary to the advice that I gave and to the principles of honesty and equity
I hold dear (Sachs 2005: 146-147).Ó
You protest too
much, Dr. Sachs. Is it possible to be so nice in our discriminations of the
ÒgoodÓ versus the ÒbadÓ things, especially when dealing with the primitive
accumulation of capital? Can Sachs have forgotten the Òfire and bloodÓ that set
the stage for the triumph of Scottish Enlightenment thinkers like David Hume
and Adam Smith he so admires: the massacres of the Highlanders at the end of
1745 rebellion and the clearances that followed throughout the end of the 18th
and 19th centuries (so deftly described by Scott in the epigraph of
this piece). The ghosts of those dead Highlanders greeted the G8 leaders in
Gleneagles and perhaps spoke a little truth that was not drowned out by the
fairy tale of pacific capitalist development Adam Smith began to tell and Sachs
continues to this day. A more sober assessment of the process of introducing
neoliberal globalization into societies where there are commons-based systems
of reproduction would have been called for, given the realities of collapsing
incomes and increasing ÒpovertyÓ in many countries that have given over the
direction of their economies to the ÒexpertsÓ like Sachs.
The main point of my
political review, however, is not
to slay once again the ailing dragon of neoliberal globalization theory. It is
to interrogate the definition of SachsÕ overt project and then to delineate its
covert political purpose.
Sachs claims not be
a doctrinaire neoliberal economist, but a clinical economist who uses the tools of neoliberal theory to diagnose the causes of economic diseases and to provide
appropriate therapies (Sachs 2005:
71-89). The disease he is attacking in this book is Òpoverty,Ó and the last
part of his book is a plan to end poverty by 2025 (an attractive date since the
bulk of his readers have a relatively good chance to reach it alive!) To be
precise, the ending of the economic disease of Òextreme povertyÓ is a goal only
the most doctrinaire neoliberal or fanatical neoconservative would openly find
fault with (although some of them have objected to Dr. SachsÕ prescription).
Yes, the ending of Òextreme povertyÓ (after creating so much of it), in twenty
years would be a triumph of neoliberal capitalism. But with one plan after
another to Òend povertyÓ since Robert McNamaraÕs World Bank years in the 1970s,
launched by the usual suspects—the UN, the World Bank, the development
BINGOs (Big International NGOs)—leading to the intensification of
ÒmiseryÓ in Africa, and a political rejection of neoliberal economics in South
and Central America (including the violent expulsion of one of SachsÕ coworkers,
Sachez de Lozada, from the presidency of Bolivia by thousands of indigenous
protesters in the period of the Ògas warsÓ) there is much justifiable suspicion
of SachsÕ claims.
Indeed, since Dr.
Sachs claims to be an economic clinician, he should remember that one of the
most important Hippocatic maxims is: do no harm! Why is Dr. Sachs so sure he understands the poverty
that he claims his plan can end? Should we trust that he and his ÒLive8Ó
colleagues will, at least, do no harm? A reason for doubt are the two
different, non-synonymous definitions of Òextreme povertyÓ he offers: (a)
Òextreme poverty means that house holds cannot meet basic needs,Ó and (b)
extreme poverty means an Òincome of $1 per day per person, measured at
purchasing power parity.Ó Many an African or South American villager can
testify on the basis of his/her own experience that these definitions do not
have the same meaning. There are
many villages where Òbasic needsÓ of their residents as they conceive them are
satisfied, but whose collective income is less than $365 a year per person. Are
these villagers extremely poor and, if so, in what way?
Technically, (a) is
a Òuse valueÓ definition while (b) is an Òexchange valueÓ definition. Such
definitions, however, are systematically non-synonymous (as the famous
Òwater/diamondsÓ parable has illustrated since Adam SmithÕs day, although now,
with the privatization of water, it has become less salient!). For example, in
many villages in Africa adults (including, in certain areas, women) have access
to (although not ownership of) land that they can use for subsistence. This is an
enormous wealth (Òuse valueÓ) that cannot be alienated and hence does not have
an Òexchange value.Ó But if each adult has land accessible to satisfy his/her basic
needs, is that person poor even though, e.g., access to similar land in other
part of the country might be ÒworthÓ a few hundred dollars? Is the imputed
value of the common land, divided by the number of commoners, part of the
annual income of the villagers? Similar points can be made about children. In
many parts of Africa, children are ÒsharedÓ by villages or extended families
and their actual income is below $1 a day per person. These children often have
their Òbasic needsÓ satisfied in a collective manner. Are these children
extremely poor, even though the caring hands they pass through on their way to
adulthood satisfy their basic needs? Though they get water to drink, not diamonds
to wear, is that extreme poverty?
After all, what does
the Òexchange valueÓ measure of extreme poverty--the quantity $1 a day measure
when considered from the point of view of purchasing power parity
(PPP)—come to? The definition of PPP Sachs and the World Bank use is Òthe
number of units of a countryÕs currency needed to buy in the country the same
amount of goods and services as, say, one US dollar could buy in the U.S.Ó
Consequently, according to the definition, an extremely poor person is someone who
ÒlivesÓ on the Ògoods and servicesÓ that one can buy for $1 a day in the US. It
is clear that definition (b) implies definition (a), in that surely one cannot
satisfy oneÕs basic needs on a dollar a day in the US alone, but even that
statement is too weak, for according to the common understanding of what can be
bought in the US for $1 a day, the people that fall under this definition ought
all to be dead. But they are not.
How is this possible? There must
be non-monetary ways that the more
than 1.1 billion people who fit the definition of Òextremely poor,Ó according
to Sachs, have organized to reproduce their and their familiesÕ lives.
It is notoriously
ÒdifficultÓ for economists to determine the value of unwaged reproductive
ÒservicesÓ even in a fully monetarized society, it certainly is even more so in
a form of life where the unwaged portion overwhelms the waged. Consequently,
the surveys that are used to determine the monetary value of Ògoods and
servicesÓ the poor consume are so unreliable they can add or subtract hundreds
of millions from the category of extreme poverty on the basis of an arbitrary
accounting change (see, e.g., the internal World Bank debate between Angus
Deaton (2002), who finds no change in the number of Òextremely poorÓ since the
early 1980s, and Shaohua Chan and Martin Ravillion (2004), who find a 400
million decline in the number of extremely poor people on the planet, mostly in
China).
This Òdifficulty,Ó
arbitrariness and evasion is an old story as far as the notion of the poverty
is concerned, since the real
definition of being poor is that of one who ought not to be aliveÉaccording to
the rules of the capitalist systemÉbut is! For the historical moment (some time
in the nineteenth century in Europe) when the wage stopped being the badge of
the poor (and the stigma of a lack of independence) and began to guarantee the
capacity to reproduce the worker within the system, the wageless poor were
logically doomed.
Yet,
though the wageless poor were not to be reproduced by the capitalist system, still
they survive as living paradoxes. Their ÒirrationalÓ existence has meant to
generations of capitalists that they were a priori criminals (often violating yet undreamed of
statutes!) To many Marxists, these wageless ones--the urban Òlumpen
proletariatÓ or the reactionary peasant Òrural idiotsÓ--being undisciplined by
the wage, were to be treated with suspicion until they too could be brought
into the waged working class proper. But to many other anti-capitalists, the
poor became the evidence of the existence of a communal continent that existed
below the surface of capitalist reality waiting to emerge, both in the planetÕs
countryside and its cities. This continent has been the object of many studies
made by anthropologists and political activists as well as intelligence agents
(often shifting identities in the course of a career). Though its existence has
often been debated, its earthquakes have certainly created political tsunamis
across the planet. After all, the major revolutionary movements of the
twentieth century--from ZapataÕs peasant column entering Mexico City through
the nomadic Chinese Red Army through the Viet Cong fighters to the EZLN cadresÕ
insurrection against NAFTA on January 1, 1994—arose out of these wageless
ones and shook the world.
Consequently, for
capitalists there is an ambivalent anxiety concerning the wageless poor. They
are fearful of this land of the Òliving dead,Ó but they cannot do without it.
After all, the existence of the extremely poor is the basic disciplinary threat to be used against the
waged workers of the world. On the one side, they are to be the ÒhorrificÓ
image of what could happen to a waged working class, if it refuses to accept
the dictates of neoliberal capitalism and, on the other side, they are to be a
standing Òreserve armyÓ in case capital decides to pick some subset of them for
Òdevelopment.Ó
But the world does
not wait on capital, the Òextremely poorÓ necessarily have created non-monetary
reproductive systems that have demonstrated the power of communal relations to
be able to resist enclosures and provide subsistence in ways that the Scottish
Highlanders could never have imagined. On the basis of these systems the poor
are beginning to set off new political earthquakes (especially in South
America) or, in the face of increasing demonetarization, their reliance on
communal relations is creating a situation where they stop being credible
potential competitors on the international labor market (especially in Africa).
The Òpoor,Ó
therefore, constitute contemporary capitalÕs Scylla and Charybdis. Poor
peopleÕs attacks on and exits from globalization must both be quelled to give neoliberal globalization a new
impulse according to Dr. SachsÕ diagnosis. Therefore, it is important to see
why it is that Sachs is so insistent on only attacking Òextreme povertyÓ and
assisting more than a billion people to break out of the Òpoverty trapÓ that
keeps them from grasping Òthe first rung of the development ladder.Ó The
poverty he wants eliminated by 2025 is one that makes it difficult for the poor
person to be a waged worker, even potentially. It used to be said that in a
capitalist society the only thing worse for a worker than being exploited, is
not being exploited at all. But Sachs recognizes the adage cuts both ways, the
only thing worse for the capitalist system than a reduction of exploitation is
the reduction of the exploitable! Putting aside SachsÕ moral imperatives and
his appeals to the heritage of the Enlightenment, the pragmatic consequence of
SachsÕ medicine is that the pool of potential competitors in the worldÕs wage
labor market should be dramatically enlarged once again.
Dr. Sachs is
committed to saving capitalism from a catastrophe that all but blind
doctrinaire neoliberals (with their neoconservative allies) see approaching.
These neoliberals simply assume that if the fickle finger of the world labor market
consigns billions to wagelessness, the condemned will automatically disappear
or, if they resist, they can be isolated, bombed and starved out. Sachs knows
that this just a pipe dream. For the inability to keep expanding the world
labor market, and the increasing refusal of many of the peoples of the former
colonized regions to be profitably exploited by capital, will create a dramatic
reduction in the average rate of profit. In his role as the early 21st
century John Maynard Keynes, he like Keynes is not interested in debating the
justice (and even the ultimate fate) of capitalism, but he is not as sanguine
as Keynes was that capitalists would be willing to accept a couple of per cent
as a profit rate just to keep their interesting game going. Sachs is anxious,
as a clinician to capitalism (his other, more troublesome patient!), that the
world labor market (not the world population) grows in the future, providing
the necessary control of the rest of the working class. This aspect of his
argument gives his proposals a capitalist Òhook.Ó
The confusing,
non-synonymous definitions of Òextreme povertyÓ Sachs uses, therefore, are
essential to the political project he is embarked upon: (1) to sell to the
world capitalist class (most directly represented by the club of G8 ÒleadersÓ)
the proposition that a small investment in the reproduction of the wageless of
the world in order to transform them into credible competitors in the world
wage labor market will be crucial to save the capitalist system into the mid-21st
century and (2) to convince the militants of the antiglobalization movement to
eschew their pessimism Òabout the possibilities of capitalism with a human
face, in which the remarkable power of trade and investment can be harnessed
while acknowledging and addressing limitations through compensatory collective
actionsÓ (Sachs 2005: 357). For if the PPP definition is taken as identical to
the ÒhumanisticÓ basic needs definition, then it would appear that the most
efficient path to end extreme poverty in a society (hence satisfying the
anti-globalization militants) is to simply put in place throughout the world the
conditions for introducing wage labor at a rate greater than, say, 10 cents an
hour (hence satisfying his capitalist audience).
But if the basic
needs /Òuse valueÓ definition is clearly distinguished from the Ò$1 a dayÓ one,
then the most efficient way to eliminate poverty in a society would be to
decommodify peopleÕs basic needs while returning all available resources (land,
natural resources, etc.) to communal control. It is exactly this path of
decommodification and communalization in the long-run that Sachs is hoping to avoid, even though his plan
requires it in the short-run
(i.e., until at least 2025) by providing to the poor free education, free
nutrition programs, free antimalarial equipment, free drinking water,
sanitation and cooking fuels. But
it is exactly this tension between the short-run and long-run (which is the
source of KeynesÕ famous cynical epigram) that Sachs evades. For there is no
automatic reason why people who have Òescaped the poverty trapÓ through
decommodification of basic needs and the development of their commons will
necessarily rush to sell their labor-power to the first capitalist offering a
wage.
In conclusion,
SachsÕ prescription for his primary, though unacknowledged, patient, the
capitalist class, is: invest in bringing more than a billion of the Òextremely
poorÓ into planetary labor market by 2025. The sugar coating on this pill is to
make this effort appear as an altruistic act (and hence potentially attractive
to some of the militants of the anti-globalization movement). But if the
response of the G8 ÒleadersÓ at Gleneagles is any indication, the patient is
still suspicious of the doctorÕs prescription. As well it should be, for The
End of Poverty marks a ÒreturnÓ to
Keynesian Òshort-termÓ medicine, but now applied on a global scale, albeit to
save neoliberal globalization in the long-run. This, however, is exactly what
the neoliberal ÒrevolutionÓ has turned the world upside down to avoid over the
last quarter century. Are the capitalists desperate to go back to their vomit?
What impact Dr.
SachsÕ medicine might have on the anti-globalization movement is even more
ambiguous. It cannot be assessed by comparing the number of viewers of the
ÒLive8Ó concerts with the number of anti-G8 demonstrators arrested in Scotland.
Its political fate will be decided the ultimate source of the
anti-globalization movement, i.e., in the thousands of sites of confrontations
around the control of natural gas and petroleum in Bolivia and Niger Delta,
against the drug company super-profits in South Africa and Brazil, for the
preservation of the commons in Columbia and KenyaÉ.
Parma
July 15, 2005
Bibliography
Chan, Shaohua and Martin
Ravallion (2004). ÒHow have the WorldÕs Poor Fared since the early 1980s?Ó World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3341
(June).
Deaton, Angus (2002). ÒIs
World Poverty Falling?Ó Finance and Development 39 (2).
Sachs, Jeffrey (2005). The
End of Poverty: How We Canm Make It Happen in our Lifetime. London: Penguin Books.